This paper develops a two-stage stochastic program and solution procedure to optimize the selection of seismic retrofit strategies to increase the resilience of electric power systems to earthquake hazards. The model explicitly considers the range of earthquake events that are possible and, for each, an approximation to the distribution of damage that is experienced. This is important because electric power systems are spatially distributed; hence their performance is driven by the distribution of damage of the components. We test this solution procedure against the nonlinear integer solver in LINGO 13 and apply the formulation and solution strategy to the Eastern Interconnection where the seismic hazard stems from the New Madrid Seismic Zone.
INTRODUCTION
Earthquakes pose a significant risk to electric power systems as demonstrated by the following examples. On January 17, 1994 the Northridge earthquake struck the city of Los Angeles and surrounding areas. Two and a half million customers lost power (Dong et al. 2004 ). The Great Hanshin earthquake occurred a year later affecting the city of Kobe, Japan.
Twenty fossil-fire power generation units, six 275 kV substations, and two 154 kV substations were damaged. Approximately, 2.6 million customers were affected by outages (Noda 2001) . On May 18, 2008, the Wenchuan earthquake caused extensive damage to the local power transmission and distributions systems in the Sinchuan province, China.
Approximately 900 substations and 270 transmission lines of the State Power Grid were damaged. It has been estimated that at least 90% of the damage could have been avoided by adopting new guidelines for seismic design (Eidinger 2009 ). 90% of Chileans did not have electricity immediately following the February 27, 2010 8.8 MW earthquake. The event caused the largest power transmission company in Chile to have direct losses of with 16 substations, located in the Nagoya region, Japan.
We implement a knapsack-based heuristic to solve the non-linear integer programming problem (NLIP) to optimize the selection of reinforcement strategies for electric power system components. For each mitigation strategy for each component we use an integer variable with an associated cost and estimate of risk reduction, if implemented. The selection of the investments using this structure under a budget limit yields a knapsack problem. A knapsack problem is a binary integer programming problem where the goal is to select a subset of items, each with a known cost, that yields the largest combined benefit and for which the combined cost of all items selected does not exceed the specified budget.
To model the seismic risk, we use a suite of earthquake scenarios that nearly replicates the estimated exceedance curves for peak ground acceleration (PGA) as given in the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) Seismic Hazard Maps (USGS 2008b) at 81 control locations
across the NMSZ. Since the electric power system is a spatially distributed system, we create a suite of consequence scenarios for each earthquake scenario, where each consequence scenario identifies the resulting damage state of each component. Once the damage state of a component is known, the expected time required for the component to be operational again and the cost of the repair can be estimated. The construction of these consequence scenarios provides an implicit representation of the distribution of damage for each earthquake scenario. The damage to the power grid considered is limited to transmission lines and substations. The operation of the power grid is modeled using an economic dispatch model. An economic dispatch model is an optimization model used to match electric power supply with demand in the lowest cost manner possible. We assume that the operator of the network has a limited budget to invest in mitigating the risk. The method is illustrated using the U. S.
Eastern Interconnection power grid (EI); a network with more than 20,000 transmission lines and about 15,000 buses. A much simpler dataset for the NLIP is solved using LINGO 13 (Lindo System Inc. 2011). The results using LINGO and our proposed heuristic are compared for different mitigation budgets to gain a sense of the performance of the heuristic.
The next section develops the formulation. The third section presents the solution procedure (which is a heuristic). The fourth section describes the key elements of the case study. The fifth section describes the results of the application of the tools developed in sections two and three to the case study described in section four. It also includes a comparison of the performance of the solution procedure developed in the third section to This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
Romero -4 We first introduce the topology of the power network. Let Π be the set of transmission lines. Let S be the set of substations. Let G be the set of generators. Let B be the set of buses.
Let I(i) be the set of the electric power generators connected to bus i. We define the first- 
In this application, the cost of the seismic reinforcement of transmission lines is assumed to be a percentage of the total replacement cost of the line obtained from Balducci (Balducci et al. 2006) . Seismic reinforcement of substations is defined as the anchorage of the transformers in the substations. Therefore the cost to reinforce a substation is estimated by This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
Romero -5 multiplying the cost of anchoring a transformer (Shinozuka et al. 2003) by the number of transformers in the substation. Therefore, all the components in substations under complete damage are back to normal within a month with the exception of medium and high voltage transformers, for which is 6 months. For transmission lines we only model two levels of damage: extensive and complete.
Extensive damage for a transmission line corresponds to a damage ratio of 50% of the total cost of the line and complete damage results in costs totaling the full cost of the line.
Transmission lines under extensive damage can be repaired within 3 days and under complete damage within a week. This implies that by the end of 6 months, in the worst case, the system is back to normal.
The repair times given above implies that we must divide the repair process into 4 time This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
Romero -6 We assume that there are N earthquake consequence scenarios, i.e., n=1,…,N. The associated annual probability of scenario n is Pr(n). Let c B be the cost per unit of demand which cannot be satisfied (per unit load shed cost). Let This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright ( Let m ij be the reactance in transmission line (i,j) and let T ij be an indicator with value 1 when the operator has a spare transformer for transmission line (i,j) and 0 otherwise.
Constraints (2), (3), (4), and (5) 
, , , 
We assume that generator g has capacity m g G and transmission line (i,j) has capacity m ij P .
Equations (8)- (12) 
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Romero -8 
where s i is the substation, to which bus i belongs. The objective function of the two-stage stochastic program is to minimize the expected generation, load shed and repair costs in the four recovery periods as given in Equation (13).
Pr( )
where
Note that the two-stage stochastic program (1) - (13) Pr( )
subject to constraints ( 
subject to (1). Notice that this is a knapsack problem. This motivates our solution procedure described in the next section.
SOLUTION PROCEDURE
As mentioned previously, the first-stage problem is a knapsack problem with a nonlinear objective function. The key idea of our heuristic is to construct a knapsack problem with This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright (2013) linear objective function so that the solution of the knapsack problem is also a good solution to the first-stage problem. The heuristic consists of four steps. The first step is to run the direct current (dc) economic dispatch model assuming all components are available. The second step is to run the dc economic dispatch assuming that a single component ∈ set(R)
(set of all components that can be reinforced) is not functional. The third step is done for each component that can be reinforced. That step involves computing the relative benefit from reinforcing each component. The fourth step identifies the subset of reinforcement strategies that maximizes the benefit (as approximated using the weights developed in step 2) subject to the budget constraint given in equation (1). To simplify the notations, let us consider the following parametric dc load flow dispatch problem where we determine (θ i ,G g ,P ij ,U i ) that
where τ ij and i s  are input parameters for all (i,j). The solution procedure is then as follows.
Step 1: Run the dc flow economic dispatch problem (16) - (21) with 0
Note that the load shed at each bus U i =0 since we assume that all components in the network are functional. Let  be the optimal objective value.
Step 2: Let the set(R) be comprised of the collection of components r for which there is at least one consequence scenario under which the component is not operational but with mitigation it becomes operational, for at least one time period. Run the dc flow economic dispatch problem (16) - (21) for each component r∈ set(R) assuming that component r is not
Romero -10
Copyright (2013) Step 3: Estimate the benefit of reinforcement for all components for which it is a consideration. Let r∈ set(R) be the members of that set.
If
It is important to notice that in the fourth time period some large transformers may not be operational in some substations. The substation may still be used, but its performance has not been fully restored. To reflect this we define () Ssbe the serviceability of a substation. The definition of this quantity is the fraction of lines and transformers that are functional within the substation to the total number of lines and transformers (both functional and nonfunctional) within the substation. Notice that the values λ ij and λ s are the result of step 2.
Also, Step 4: Determine the reinforcement strategy for the network. Run the integer problem to determine the reinforcement strategy (x,y) that maximize This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright ( We only consider the seismic risk from the NMSZ. In order to model the hazard, the first step is to develop a suite of earthquake scenarios (location and magnitude) that replicate important measures of the seismic hazard. For electric power systems, the key measure is the annual exceedance curves for PGA where seismically sensitive components are located. We located 81 control points in the NMSZ area and obtained the PGA exceedance curves for each point from the USGS Seismic Hazard Maps (USGS 2008b).
For our modeling, the hazard is represented by a set of earthquake scenarios (and their hazard-adjusted probabilities of occurrence) selected using the mathematical optimization method developed by Vaziri et al. (2012) . The method which select the events and their hazard-adjusted occurrence probabilities so as to minimize the error between the annual exceedance probability of PGA curves implied by the selected scenarios, and the "true" PGA This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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curves, which for this analysis are given in the USGS Seismic Hazard Maps (USGS 2008b).
A key input to that optimization is the identification of the candidate set of earthquake events.
We used two sources to create the candidate set: the earthquake catalog from the USGS website (USGS 2008) and a synthetic data set created by the USGS. This earthquake catalog includes 433 earthquakes that occurred within the NMSZ. The magnitudes were converted from m blg to M W using Atkinson and Boore (1995) and Johnston (1996) equally weighted as given in Petersen et al (2008) . The mean PGA for each control point was estimated using Toro et al (1997) , Frankel et al (1996 ), Campbell (2003 , Atkinson and Boore (2006) , Tavakoli and Pezeshk (2005) , and Silva et al (2002) assuming soil type BC (shear-wave velocity, 760 m/s), the relative weights given in Petersen et al (2008) . In addition to the 433 earthquakes identified in the Central-East Unites States earthquake scenarios catalog, we use 20 synthetic events on 5 synthetic faults created by USGS to refine the representation of the hazard in New Madrid. The 20 scenarios correspond to each of 4 possible magnitudes (7.3, 7.5, 7.7 and 8) for ruptures in the 5 different branches described in Petersen et al (2008) .
USGS (2008c) provides computer code that can be compiled and run to generate each of these deterministic scenarios in New Madrid. and the exceedance information provided by USGS. This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright (2013) Under each scenario the probability that each component sustains specific levels of damage is then computed using a regional loss estimation methodology, in this case HAZUS (FEMA 2003) . HAZUS categorizes damage to substations and transmission lines into five classes: no damage, slight, moderate, extensive and complete. HAZUS defines the probability that a component sustains each of five damage stages after an earthquake of a certain intensity, and considering if the component was seismically retrofitted or not. As mentioned before we only modeled moderate, extensive and complete damage for substations and extensive and complete for transmission lines. For the analysis in this paper, we assume that none of the substation components have been anchored, and that transmission towers have not been seismically reinforced. This assumption is based on data availability not intrinsic limitations in the modeling process.
Since the performance of a network is governed by the distribution of damage over all components, each earthquake scenario must be translated into a set of consequence scenarios.
In each consequence scenario, the level of damage of each component is specified. More generally, we develop these consequence scenarios specifying the condition for each component with and without seismic mitigation, which for transmission lines is seismic retrofit and for substation components, anchorage of subcomponents. Each consequence scenario is identified by a revised-adjusted occurrence probability, which combines the probability of the occurrence of the earthquake scenario and the probability of the damage level for each component from that earthquake scenario.
We use the optimization method introduced by Brown et al. (2011) to develop consequence scenarios and their probability of occurrence. Each consequence scenario has a realized damage state for each component of the infrastructure and an associated probability.
The objective of the optimization is to select a defined number of consequence scenarios and occurrence probabilities so that when all the consequence scenarios are combined the estimated vulnerabilities of each component match the "true" (input) vulnerability as closely as possible. In this case, the "true" vulnerability is defined by HAZUS fragility curves (FEMA 2003) . For the purposes of this research, the Brown et al. (2011) optimization model is expanded to include the performance of the components prior to reinforcement and after reinforcement.
The six events with m blg less than 6 (See Table 1 ) result in effectively no physical damage to the electric power grid based on the fragility curves given in HAZUS and the probability This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright ( distribution for PGA for each event at each location (FEMA 2003) . The earthquake scenario on the Mid-East fault of magnitude 7.7 M W , and the earthquake scenario on the West fault of magnitude 8.0 M W do result in considerable damage. For each of these events, we generate 6 consequence scenarios. Notice that the sum of the revised-adjusted occurrence probabilities of each of these two sets of scenarios in Table 2 equals the corresponding hazard-adjusted occurrence probably for the event scenario given in Table 1 . The average error across both earthquake scenarios for the probability that each component is in each of the damage states is less than 7%. Table 2 presents the 12 consequence scenarios and the number of transmission lines and substations that fall into each of the possible damage states. The third column presents the probability that we assigned to each scenario to match the ground motion hazard probability and the components' vulnerability. Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of PGA for the earthquake scenario in the West branch with a magnitude of 8.0 M W and the consequence scenario 6 (See ID column in Table 2 ). It is useful to notice that there is substantial damage across the New Madrid area including in Memphis, TN, Evansville, IN and St. Louis, IL. Figure 4 gives the estimated load shed for that same event. Again, the impacts across the region are very significant, especially around Memphis, which is the nearest city to the earthquake rupture. 
RESULTS
The proposed solution procedure was tested using a simplified version of the model which considers only the first time period and two of the twelve earthquake scenarios. We This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright ( Inc. 2011) -which has a non-linear integer solver-in a Dell Precision T5500, Intel® Xeon® X5650 with 2 processors of 2.66 GHz., and 6.00 GB of total RAM memory. LINGO found a solution with 0.5% lower total seismic risk costs solution for a mitigation budget of US$100 million; for the other two problem instances the solution procedure described above found solutions that resulted in 20% lower repair and load shed costs. LINGO took over 8 hours to solve and the solution procedure described above took 8 minutes. Given the computational burden, LINGO cannot be used to address the full problem formulation for the EI.
We used the heuristic to find a seismic risk mitigation strategy for the full problem formulation for the EI using the 12 consequence scenarios identified to represent the NMSZ hazard. EI performance after an event was modeled using the 4 time periods as defined by the repair times for the various components described above. We assume about 50 lines and 110 substations are viable candidates for reinforcement. The total running time varies depending on the budget; the average computation time is 1 hour using the machine described above. This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright ( Area. The event is so severe in the Memphis area that mitigation has little effect. However in the areas that are more removed from the event, the insult is significantly less severe so the mitigation has a more pronounced effect. For example the load shed is reduced by about 45%
in the area that is between 100km and 200 km from the fault rupture. This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has developed a method, using two-stage stochastic programming, to identify an approximately optimal seismic mitigation strategy for electric power system components that can be used to address large scale problem instances. It makes use of methods already developed to create a range of seismic events (location and magnitude) and their hazardconsistent probabilities to characterize the hazard. For each of these events, consequence
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Copyright ( scenarios and their probability of occurrence are developed to understand the distribution of damage under that event and the level of degradation in system performance. These two steps provide a robust mechanism to understand the impacts of earthquakes on the system and how that impact might be modified through specific investments. The remainder of the paper developed an optimization method to understand how to optimize the selection of mitigation strategies under a budget constraint.
More specifically, a two-stage stochastic program was developed. The first stage identifies the mitigation strategies to perform, whereas the second stage is effectively an economic dispatch model of the electric power system to compute the repair costs and the load shed under each consequence scenario, based on the investments made. In the case study developed in this paper, the regional loss estimation methodology, HAZUS (FEMA 2003) , was used to compute the probability that each component fell into each of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive damage states for each consequence scenario. The method was applied to the EI, which has almost 15,000 nodes and 23,000 links, and the seismic hazard considered stems from the NMSZ.
There are a range of opportunities for further research. First, the key mitigation strategy considered in this paper is the anchoring of components. There is also the opportunity to add capacity to the existing network to increase earthquake resilience. How to add this additional capacity then becomes the subject of an optimization. Also, we do not consider the question of the optimization of spare transformers including which ones to hold in inventory pre-event and how they should be deployed post-event. One of the key benefits of addressing seismic hazards via capacity augmentation is that the added capacity is valuable under a range of circumstances beyond addressing the consequences of earthquakes including periods of peak demand (heat waves, etc.), hurricanes and ice storms. Moreover, under normal operation, the added capacity can enable cheaper, cleaner or more sustainable generation or increased reliability.
Second, the assessment of the impacts of each of the consequence scenarios based on the mitigation performed did not include the potential for further cascading beyond the initial damage. While the cascading usually involves outages that do not damage components, it can lead to a more widespread load shed (blackouts) that can delay the recovery from the earthquake. Modeling cascades in electric power systems stemming from earthquakes is complicated, and approximate methods are beginning to be developed (Kim and Dobson This preprint is a PDF of a manuscript that has been accepted for publication in Earthquake Spectra. It is the final version that was uploaded and approved by the author(s) with figures embedded in the text.
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Copyright ( 2010). Cascades occur when the system is fragile and in a damaged state. Hence, consideration of the potential for cascades when developing mitigation strategies for electric power systems may turn out to be important.
Third, the input data does not capture damage from local site conditions, or the specific vulnerability of each component. Detailed soil information for the study, structural design of the components located in critical areas, and specific structural retrofitting options for each component would be valuable contributions to a dataset for a model of this nature.
Finally, the electric power system is critical to the operation of many other infrastructures. Conversely, the electric power system is dependent on other infrastructures.
Understanding the impact of earthquakes on interdependent infrastructures (including electric power networks) is very important. In the context of mitigation, this avenue for additional research becomes even more compelling.
